In order to offload network traffic, we design a device caching strategy by jointly considering a popularity model, social influence and incentive design in this paper. Firstly, we propose a prediction model by virtue of users' social network information to evaluate users' encounter probability. Moreover, users' content preference is predicted using users' context information. Based on these predicted values, a content placement algorithm is described provided that the users will fully cooperate to optimize system performance. Thereafter, a more practical scenario where users are selfish and unwilling to devote their resources is considered. A Stackelberg game is established between the mobile network operator (MNO) and users by providing an incentive to encourage cooperation. Device caching strategy and incentive price design are determined by analyzing the Stackelberg game and finding the Stackelberg equilibrium point. We verify the effectiveness of our prediction models utilizing real data sets. Simulation results show that the cache hit ratio can be considerably improved by exploiting social and context information. Incentive design and profit analysis are also thoroughly investigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is revealed by the latest report from Cisco that the number of mobile Internet user equipments is anticipated to achieve as many as threefold the global population. Moreover, cellular video-on-demand service will as of 2021 account for 63% of all Internet traffic [1] . This unprecedented increased volume of wireless traffic needs cellular networks to exploit more bandwidth, reduce transmission delay and provide a higher quality of service (QoS). However, the conventional network architecture, where all contents are stored at remote servers, can not be the solution to these new requirements. Heterogeneous networks, which are comprised of both small cells and macro cells, can increase system capacity by dense deployment of base stations [2] . Nevertheless, more base stations means a higher load on core network backhaul, and this problem needs to be addressed for the future cellular network.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Justin Zhang. Thanks to the decreasing disk storage prices and the fact that typically only a small portion of contents is very popular and account for the majority of data traffic, content caching is envisioned to improve the efficiency in wireless content delivery and alleviate the traffic load on network backhaul [3] - [5] . Nonetheless, only a small portion of contents, in contrast to the vast amount of content available in multimedia platforms, can be placed in edge node caches. Accordingly, intelligent cache content placement schemes should be carefully designed to unleash the full potential of caching technique.
A. RELATED WORK
Many challenges of cache content placement concern content popularity modeling, which is crucial to caching optimization. Independent Reference Model (IRM) [6] - [8] is a popular model in literature on caching. However, it sacrifices accuracy for large time-scale analysis due to the assumption of identical and stationary content popularity. To capture the non-stationarity characteristics of content popularity, online caching policies such as Least-Recently-Used (LRU) and
Least-Frequently-Used (LFU) [9] - [12] has been extensively studied because of its low implement complexity.
Despite the advantage of such reactive techniques, proactive caching based on the prediction of content popularity by virtue of machine learning tools has attracted a lot attention from both academia and industry [13] - [16] . In [13] , an algorithm that combines the machine learning framework of echo state networks (ESNs) with sublinear algorithms is proposed. Using ESNs, the baseband units (BBUs) can predict each user's content request distribution and mobility pattern while having only limited information on the network's and user's state. In [14] , a novel algorithm based on the machine learning framework of conceptor-based ESNs is proposed to solve the problem of proactive deployment of cache-enabled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In [15] , a distributed algorithm based on the machine learning framework of liquid state machine (LSM) is proposed. Using the proposed LSM algorithm, the cloud can predict the users' content request distribution while having only limited information on the network's and users' states. In particular, the perspective of individual user preference in content requests is more reasonable for caching policy design in device-todevice (D2D) communication scenario [17] . In this paper, we propose a user preference prediction algorithm based on file and user similarity to facilitate content placement design.
Since an individual user device's storage is relatively small and content sharing between users is opportunistic, high caching performance can only be achieved through elaborate cooperation among users. Users' social relationship can have an impact on a user's interest, mobility pattern as well as willingness to cooperate, which are essential to user cooperation. The influence of social structure on network performance has been studied [19] - [20] . The impact of social relationships on the overall transmission rate of D2D communication networks as well as the correlation of the social feature and the probability of requesting transmission are discussed in these works. Encounter probability between users, which can also be reflected by social relationships, is another crucial factor to consider in order to design efficient content placement schemes in D2D communication networks.
Social awareness has also been considered in caching policy design [21] - [24] . In [21] , a social-aware caching game to incentivize nodes to cache data for others is proposed to minimize the total cost of getting object data in the network. Both the social ties and physical distance as the factors to formulate the caching cost are considered. The authors of [22] analyze the impact of mobile social networks (MSNs) on the performance of edge caching in fog radio access networks (F-RANs). A Markov chain-based model is proposed to analyze edge caching among edge nodes. The proposed algorithm in [23] takes into account the social relationship between D2D users and caches contents at important users (IUs) based on stochastic geometry theory. In [24] , the affiliation network model is adopted to capture the social network evolution process.
Because users are naturally selfish, D2D transmitters in the real world are unlikely to cache and share contents with others unconditionally. Therefore, an efficient incentive mechanism is needed to motivate D2D transmitters to cooperate with each other. Users' incentive mechanism design aiming at connectivity-centric services is studied in [25] , [26] . By providing users with incentive, the MNO can also improve profit by offloading traffic with a lower payment compared to the cost of serving users with its own resource. In addition, higher quality of experience (QoE) can be achieved, thereby attracting more new subscribers to the MNO's network and accordingly making more income. In the cache-enabled D2D communication scenario, a new question arises, namely, how to motivate users to cache contents at their devices.
Incentive design for cache-enabled D2D communications is investigated in [27] - [30] . More specifically, in [27] , the authors formulate the conflict among users and the tension between the MNO and the users as a Stackelberg game and aim to minimize the cost of the MNO and maximize the utility for each user. The authors of [28] propose a centralized caching-based incentive mechanism, which stimulates mobile users to cache and forward contents for MNOs. In [29] , the authors classify the users into different types according to their preference to share cache resources and an optimization problem is formulated based on contract theory aiming at maximizing the MNO's utility. In [30] , the authors formulate a welfare maximization problem integrating power control, channel allocation, link scheduling, and reward design by taking into account wireless features, social characteristics, and device intelligence. By combining content placement and incentive mechanism design, we propose a non-cooperative content placement scheme based on the predicted D2D transmitters encounter probability and user preference.
B. CONTRIBUTION
The aforementioned works on D2D caching considering social awareness or Stackelberg game approach overlook the crucial impact of the individual user preference in content requests on content placement design or assume that the preferences of every user are perfectly known as common knowledge within the network. Therefore, this paper is intended to design a content placement strategy by jointly considering a user preference prediction model, social influence and incentive design. Our main contributions in this paper are summarized as follows:
• To evaluate users' encounter probability, we propose a prediction scheme by exploiting users' social network information. In addition, we utilize users' context information to predict future content request probability for each user. Thereafter, based on the predicted values, we design a content placement scheme assuming that users will fully cooperate to maximize the system cache hit ratio.
• Considering a more practical scenario where users are selfish and unwilling to devote their resources, we first establish a Stackelberg game between the MNO and D2D transmitters by offering incentive price to D2D transmitters. Then we analyze the profit of the MNO and D2D transmitters. At last, we formulate a Stackelberg game based caching strategy and incentive price design problem and solve the problem by finding the Stackelberg equilibrium point.
• We analyze the correlation between encounter probability and our predicted value by utilizing a public dataset. The influence of context information on content request probability is also investigated using real dataset. System performance and incentive setting of the proposed schemes are thoroughly examined through extensive simulation results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The system model is provided in Section II. In Section III, we predict user encounter probability and user preference and design a fully cooperative content placement scheme. The non-cooperative scenario is considered in Section IV. Numerical results are provided in Section V, followed by conclusions in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we divide the overall network into two abstract layers, namely, the social network layer and the physical network layer. The network model is illustrated in Fig. 1 . More specifically, the social network layer models the social interaction between users of the devices and the physical network layer models the communication mechanism between devices and the supporting infrastructure [18] .
In the physical network layer, the macro base station (MBS) caches popular contents in its storage and can push files to user devices when the cellular network is relatively idle, such as after midnight. When a user requests for a file, it will at first try to retrieve the desired file from other user devices through D2D communication. If the file transmission requirement can not be satisfied by other user devices, the MBS will transmit the requested file to the user through cellular communication.
A file request to be fulfilled by D2D communication can only happen when two necessary conditions are satisfied simultaneously. Firstly, the file requester must be within the communication range of some other user devices. Secondly, the desired file can be found in at least one of these user devices' storage. We assume that the network is user-centric and all user devices have identical communication range.
In our model, the library of available files is a finite set, which is denoted by F = {f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f N } and stored in the memory of the MBS. Each file has an equal size of L bits. This paper will not consider cases of different file sizes. Since each file is always able to be divided into pieces of the same size, this assumption does not affect the result of this study. It is supposed that each user at a time has a request for an entire file out of the library. Each file is requested by the users with a probability. We refer to the probability as the file popularity and denote the probability of the files by a vector P = {P 1 , . . . , P n , . . . , P N }, where file n is requested with probability P n and N n=1 P n = 1. 
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To achieve maximum quality from edge caching, we choose to maximize the total hit ratio, with constraints on user devices' storage capacity. This total hit ratio is defined as the probability that a typical user can retrieve the requested content from one of the user devices through D2D communication.
There are totally U mobile users in the coverage area of the MBS. Each user is equipped with a memory of size K files to cache popular contents. We denote the content placement for all users by an U × N matrix I in which I un is the element at u-th row and n-th column taking value from {0, 1}. I un = 1 if u-th user caches n-th file, and 0 otherwise. The content requests of all users are denoted by an U × N matrix R in which R un is the element at u-th row and n-th column taking value from {0, 1}. R un = 1 if u-th user requests n-th file, and 0 otherwise. All feasible D2D communication links are denoted by an U × U matrix D in which D uv is the element at u-th row and v-th column taking value from {0, 1}. D uv = 1 if u-th user can communicate with v-th user through D2D link, and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, the problem can be formulated as follows
where R total denotes the total number of content requests by all users and min( U v=1 D uv I vn , 1) is the cache hit indicator when uth user requests nth file. If cache hit happens, it is equal to 1, otherwise 0.
We aim to design a proactive caching scheme in this paper. Therefore, R and D cannot be pre-known for the optimization problem and they are matrices of random variables. Accordingly, we intend to predict R and D in the following section and then solve the proposed problem based on the prediction results for a fully cooperative scenario.
III. FULLY COOPERATIVE CONTENT PLACEMENT
Designing efficient content placement policies fundamentally concerns answering two questions, that is, where to cache and what to cache. Answering these two questions properly is essential to unleashing the full potential of this promising technique. For example, a user device which has a small probability to establish contact with other user devices is apparently not a good choice to place popular contents. In addition, caching contents which are unlikely to be requested by other user devices is also far from optimum. In this section, we try to approach optimal content placement by addressing these two key aspects respectively. Specifically, we first analyze the encounter probability of users by virtue of social networks and then predict individual user preference for popular contents.
A. WHERE TO CACHE
Traffic offloading through caching and D2D communication needs content requester to be within the D2D communication range of a transmitter. Therefore, mobile devices which are likely to encounter with content requesters should be assigned higher priority for content placement so as to achieve better performance. In the real world, this physical encounter among user devices are related and interact closely with the logical intimacy relationship which can be reflected by the online social tie. Accordingly, this correlation between users' online and offline social network motivates us to employ users' status on the social network platform to predict users' physical encounter probability.
First of all, the most significant influence factor on two users' encounter probability is the social tie between them. More specifically, if user u and user v have more common friends, the probability for them to meet each other is supposed to be higher. To reflect the impact of two users' social tie on their encounter probability, we define a variable A uv to quantify the impact. By virtue of Jaccard similarity coefficient [21] , A uv is defined as follows:
where (u) denotes the friend set of user u on social network platform and | (u) ∩ (v)| is the cardinality of the set (u) ∩ (v). Though the encounter probability of two users is primarily correlated with their social tie, there are still other factors to inspect. Consider two users who both have a lot of friends on the social network platform. This fact implies that they are both more willing to interact with others and more likely to establish a link. Hence, these two users tend to have a high probability to interact with each other.
Therefore, we introduce another variable B uv between user u and user v to reflect the impact of users' amount of friends on their encounter probability with others. The variable B uv can be calculated as follows:
where U w=1 (w) denotes the set of all target users' friends. It can be inferred from (2) that the users with more friends lead to higher B uv value.
Finally, considering both factors analyzed above, the expected encounter probability between user u and v is predicted as follows:
where α and β are the weights associated with variables A uv and B uv respectively, and α + β = 1. We assume that when the value of A uv or B uv approaches 1, the increase of their value will not increase the value of uv as much as they do when they are close to 0. This can be implied by the fact that when a user has very few friends, adding more new friends will considerably increase their chance to meet others. In contrast, when they have many friends, adding a few more new friends will not make such a great difference on encounter probability with others. This means the function in (3) should be concave. The appropriate values of α and β can be determined according to experiments conducted with different combinations of them.
B. WHAT TO CACHE
In order to approach maximal hit ratio, the contents with higher request probability should be preferentially cached. Therefore, we propose a collaborative filtering based scheme to predict each user's content preference in this section.
The request popularity for each user is denoted by a matrix P given below.
where p un is the request probability of the u-th user for the n-th content. The global popularity for the n-th content P n can be calculated by equation P n = N u u=1 p un . As an average variable for all the users, the global popularity P n for the n-th content can be obtained by the MBS through the analysis of user behaviors during a statistical period, for example, by counting the number of times that each file is requested within the unit time or by counting the number of times that each file is requested within fixed total number of requests.
Since the global popularity can only indicate average content request trend over numerous users, utilizing user preference is more rational than exploiting global popularity with the goal of maximizing hit ratio. Content request probability for an individual user is correlated with the user's preference for a particular file category and user's demographic information. Accordingly, we can make predictions based on file similarity and user similarity as follows.
1) FILE SIMILARITY
According to a user's content download history, we can infer the user's interest in content category. More specifically, a user's request probability for unrequested files can be predicted by analyzing their similarity with the files that have been downloaded by the user.
We denote the categorization of a content n by a vector − → X n = {f n1 , f n2 , . . . , f nG }. Each element represents a category. If the content n belongs to this category, the value is equal to 1, otherwise 0. The category can be documentary, comedy, adventure, war, action and other genres.
The similarity between two contents is evaluated based on cosine similarity. More specifically, we define the similarity degree Sim f (n, m) between two contents n and m through their categorization as in (5) .
Provided the user's content download history and definition of file similarity, we can predict the user preference for unvisited contents. More specifically, the predicted request probability value for content n by user u can be expressed as follows:
where F u denotes the content subset that consists of all the downloaded contents by the user u. And p um denotes the request probability for content m by user u and is considered to be equal to the average request probability P m . After calculating all contents' p f un , we normalize the request probability of user u.
2) USER SIMILARITY
Beside the user's content download history, a user's content preference is also correlated with users' demographic information. That means with similar user features, such as occupation and age, users are more likely to have a similar interest in contents request. By analyzing the statistics of the users with similar features, a user's content preference can be inferred.
We denote the feature vector of user v by − → Y v = {y v1 , y v2 , . . . , y vL }. Each element represents a user feature, such as age, sex, occupation and other demographic information. Accordingly, the similarity between user v and w is defined as in Eq. (7).
where y vl and y wl denote the value of the l-th feature for the users v and w, respectively. We denote , where Z v n and Z v all denote the overall history request number of all the users in the set U v for content n and for all the contents, respectively.
3) COMBINE THE TWO FACTORS
Considering both content similarity and user similarity to predict user preference, the request probability of user u for unvisited content n is denoted by p un and can be computed as in (8):
where w 1 and w 2 are weight coefficients and w 1 + w 2 = 1.
Here, we suppose that the impact of p f un and p c un on p un are linear. Furthermore, the appropriate values of w 1 and w 2 can be determined by training real data sets with different choices of w 1 and w 2 value aiming to minimize prediction error.
C. FULLY COOPERATIVE CONTENT PLACEMENT
In this section, we design a content placement scheme based on the previously predicted users' encounter probability and individual request probability, provided that users are willing to fully cooperate without selfishly aiming at maximizing their own profit.
We denote S un the successful receiving times of content n by all other users when user u has cached content n, namely when I un = 1.
We denote Q u vn , v = u the successful receiving times of content n by user v from user u. We assume that a user requests the same content item at most once. Accordingly, the successful receiving times Q u vn is supposed to be 0 or 1. Moreover, the estimation of content popularity is assumed to be daily and conducted during network idle hours. Therefore,
Since Q u vn , v = u are random variables, the expected value of S un can be derived from the following equation (10) .
For each Q u vn , v = u, we can calculate its expected value as follows.
Because an offloading occurs only when D2D link is established and the requested file is in the storage of the D2D transmitter, P{Q u vn = 1} can be derived from (12) . P{Q u vn = 1} = P{R vn = 1}P{D uv = 1} = p vn uv (12) Therefore, the expected value of X ij is
Accordingly, we can obtain an expected value matrix of S un as follows
This fully cooperative scenario is intended to maximize system performance in terms of total hit ratio. Accordingly, we can design a greedy content placement algorithm for the fully cooperative scenario as follows:
IV. NON-COOPERATIVE CONTENT PLACEMENT
Due to the limitation of device battery and storage capacity, most of the users possessing mobile devices are selfish in nature. Therefore, the proposed content placement scheme in section III-C can not be realized in a non-cooperative scenario. Because the scheme is designed from a network-wide find the file n with the highest E(S un ) value.
5:
The MNO pushes file n to user u. 6:
User u caches file n. 7: end while 8: end for optimal perspective, this considerably degrades the system performance in a selfish scenario.
Selfish users aim at maximizing their own utility while avoiding contributing the limited resource to others. Accordingly, incentives can be offered in order to motivate selfish users to contribute their own resources.
In this paper, we utilize a credit-based incentive mechanism, namely, users can earn credit to share contents with others and can spend credit to access contents.
A. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE OPERATOR AND D2D TRANSMITTERS
Incentives are paid by a mobile network operator to motivate D2D transmitters to devote their resources. Hence, there is a conflict of interests between the operator and D2D transmitters. Since the operator is more powerful than D2D transmitters, we employ a Stackelberg game [31] approach to model the interactions between the operator and D2D transmitters. Specifically, the operator acts as a leader and has the privilege of acting first. D2D transmitters as followers react to the leader's actions.
The actions taken by the operator and D2D transmitters are described as follows.
Leader's Action: The operator, as the leader, first determines an incentive price. Then, the operator offers the price to the D2D transmitters in order to stimulate them to cache and share contents.
Followers' Action: After receiving the price, each D2D transmitter, as a follower, decides its caching policy according to the price so as to maximize its own profit. Then the decision on content placement is sent back to the operator.
The operator and the D2D transmitters alternately take actions until the Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved.
B. ANALYSIS OF PROFITS 1) D2D TRANSMITTERS D2D transmitters are concerned to make a profit and maximize it on caching and sharing contents for other users. A user's profit can be defined as income minus cost. The income results from the reward paid by the operator for sharing contents with other users. More specifically, the operator offers an incentive price for each successfully transmitted data bit. On the other hand, the cost is incurred by transmission energy cost and the investment for caching contents during the off-peak time. Accordingly, the profit made by a user can be expressed as follows.
where ξ denotes the incentive price determined by the operator. ξ e and ξ c denote the energy cost for unit transmitted data and the investment per cached unit data charged by the operator in the off-peak time, respectively. To motive D2D transmitters, ξ ≥ ξ e must hold. N D2D is the number of successfully transmitted file by the user through D2D communications under a specific content placement. N c is the number of cached files by the user. L denotes the size of each file.
2) BASE STATION (BS)
The operator is concerned to improve profit by motivating the users to cache and share contents with others to reduce the cost. The income results from charging users for content delivery service in the peak hour, whereas the total cost is comprised of the energy consumption by BS transmission and the incentive price provided to motive users' cooperation. The profit of the operator per unit cell over a time duration is formulated as follows:
where ξ R denotes the income per unit requested content delivery bit in the peak hour and ξ E denotes the energy consumption of BS transmission. N rq is the total amount of content delivery requests.
C. STACKELBERG GAME BASED CACHING STRATEGY AND INCENTIVE PRICE DESIGN
Based on the proposed Stackelberg game model, the operator acts according to the D2D transmitters' content placement and the D2D transmitters act according to the incentive price. They unilaterally make their own decisions on incentive price and content placement to maximize their own profit. In this section, we seek to determine incentive price and content placement to achieve Stackelberg equilibrium. Firstly, we analyze how the D2D transmitters make the content placement decision according to a specific incentive price. Thereafter, how the operator reacts to the content placement decision is addressed. Finally, the Stackelberg equilibrium between the operator and the D2D transmitters is determined.
1) THE FOLLOWER GAME
Each D2D transmitter aims to make a profit and maximize it by caching and sharing contents according to the incentive price offered by the operator. Since the user association and user request are both unknown and probabilistic, we set the expected value of a user's profit as the objective function. Accordingly, the optimization problem for an individual user v can be formulated as
In particular, the profit of user v can be expressed as follows.
where U v n is the profit of user v by caching content n.
can be calculated as follows.
We can calculate U v n by the following equation.
Therefore,
Decision of User v on Whether to Cache Content n: As long as caching the content n can make profit for user v and there is still storage space left, the user will cache the content n. Accordingly, if at least one of the E(U v n ) > 0, the user will cache some contents, otherwise it chooses not to involve in any caching or sharing activity. In order to maximize E(U v D2D ), the user will select the contents with higher E(U v n ) until the storage is full.
For a user v, the expectation profit of user v by caching content n can be calculated according to Eq. (21) . If caching content n can make profit for user v, this value need to be positive, namely, E(U v n ) > 0. Therefore, if caching content n can make a profit for user v, the following condition must hold
Let ξ v n = ξ c E(S vn ) + ξ e for user v to cache content n. The user will select the contents with higher E(U v n ) to maximize E(U v D2D ), which means smaller value of ξ v n . Therefore, we sort ξ v n in ascending order and obtain a sequence {ξ v1 , . . . , ξ v(m−1) , ξ vm , . . . , ξ vN } for user v. Only when the condition Eq. (22) for a content change, the user will change its caching decision on the content. As we sort ξ v n in an ascending order, there is no other contents with value of ξ v n between ξ v(m−1) and ξ vm . Accordingly, when incentive price satisfies ξ v(m−1) < ξ ≤ ξ vm , this condition Eq. (22) will not change for any content. Thus, if incentive price satisfies ξ v(m−1) < ξ ≤ ξ vm , then the content placement for user v will be fixed. In other words, when incentive price satisfies ξ v(m−1) < ξ ≤ ξ vm , the user will cache the contents with a lower value of ξ v n than ξ v(m−1) , and not cache the contents with value of ξ v n higher than ξ vm .
2) THE LEADER GAME
The operator reacts to the D2D transmitters' decision on content placement, and accordingly adjust the incentive price to maximize its profit. The profit-maximization problem is formulated as
where the constraint ξ e ≤ ξ ≤ ξ E means that if incentive price is smaller than D2D communication cost, D2D transmitters will not have the motivation to cache and share contents. Furthermore, if the incentive price is higher than the BS transmission cost, the BS will not have the motivation to seek for user cooperation. According to (16) , we can obtain
It can be easily proved that given fixed content placement I, E(U BS ) is maximal when ξ equals to the minimal value to maintain content placement decision of D2D transmitters.
Given a price, a user v will cache the contents with higher E(U v n ) that satisfies Eq. (22) until the storage is full in order to maximize E(U v D2D ). After caching K contents, the content placement of user v will not change due to cache capacity constraint. Furthermore, a higher price will lower the income of the MNO. Therefore, only the smallest K values of ξ v n corresponding to content n for user v are relevant. We sort ξ v n of all these smallest K values of ξ v n for all the users in ascending order, and obtain a sequence {ξ 1 , . . . , ξ m−1 , ξ m , . . . , ξ UK }. Similar to the analysis in the follower game, if incentive price satisfies ξ m−1 < ξ ≤ ξ m , then the content placement I for all the users will be fixed. Accordingly, the BS sets ξ slightly bigger than ξ m−1 but smaller than ξ m to maximize its profit with the fixed content placement.
3) STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
As for the proposed non-cooperative Stackelberg game, both the leader and the follower unilaterally select their actions and seek to achieve the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE), a stable point where neither the leader nor the followers have any incentive to alter their actions. The formal definition of the SE is described as follows.
Definition: Let ξ * be the solution to the problem (23) and I * be the solution to the problem (17) . A joint solution (ξ * , I * ) is an SE of the game when both the following conditions (25) and (26) hold:
According to this definition, the SE of the proposed game exists and can be obtained by jointly solving problem (17) and problem (23) . Based on the above analysis in Among the files that have not been cached, find the highest E(S vn ) that satisfies Eq. (22) 13:
cache file n at user v 14: end while 15: end for the leader game, a possible SE exists at a price in the set {ξ 1 , . . . , ξ m−1 , ξ m , . . . , ξ UK }. And the content placement I corresponding to a particular SE price can be determined according to the analysis of the follower game.
According to the analysis of the follower game and leader game, there exists U × K possible Equilibrium points due to the capacity limitation. For different price ξ m , the users will have different content placement I which means the value of N n=1 I vn E(S vn ) declines due to less cached contents. Therefore, we use exhaustive search method to attain the optimal SE point for the MNO. Because the MNO aims to achieve maximal profit, we propose a content placement algorithm for the non-cooperative scenario based on exhaustive search in favor of the MNO benefit.
The major complexity of the proposed Algorithm 2 comes from Step 3 to Step 6, where the complexity of determining content placement I is O(UN 2 ) for each of UK possible SE prices. Accordingly, the computational complexity of the proposed Algorithm 2 is O(KU 2 N 2 ). The contents number N is considered to be the quantity of the most popular items and not so great comparing to the overall files. Because K < N , the inequality O(KU 2 N 2 ) < O(U 2 N 3 ) holds. Since we assume that the decision is made during network idle hour and conducted daily, this polynomial complexity O(U 2 N 3 ) is considered to be affordable. In other words, the complexity of Algorithm 2 is affordable.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we present the simulation results to evaluate the performance of the proposed caching scheme. Firstly, the efficiency of the proposed prediction model for the request probability is analyzed. Secondly, the simulations of system performance associated with hit ratio are conducted under different parameters and different storage strategies. At last, we show simulation results of incentive design.
A. PREDICTION ACCURACY 1) USERS' ENCOUNTER PROBABILITY
In social domain, we use the public available location-based social networks (LBSNs) data set Brightkite [32] to evaluate users' trajectory similarity.
Brightkite was once a location-based social networking service provider where users shared their locations by checking-in. The friendship network was collected using their public API, and consists of 58,228 nodes and 214,078 edges. It also included a total of 4,491,143 check-ins of these users over the period of Apr. 2008 -Oct. 2010.
We are concerned about which D2D pairs are more likely to meet each other to share contents comparing to other D2D pairs, and cosine similarity between prediction value and real trajectory can reflect the comparison of the encounter probability between different D2D pairs. The times that user u and user v meet each other can be counted by the checking-in locations in the Brightkite dataset and we denote it by T uv . The cosine similarity of prediction value and real trajectory for user v is defined as follows.
In addition to Eq. (3), we also introduce the following two prediction models, which are also concave.
In Table. 2, we demonstrate the cosine similarity between prediction value and real trajectory with different prediction models. It can be observed that all three models have an excellent performance on predicting future trajectory. In particular, prediction model 1 is slightly better than the others. The prediction information is primarily used for content placement design. Therefore, even the model-based approach cannot achieve considerably high prediction accuracy, it is still good enough to help design efficient content placement policy. Fig. 2 shows how the training weight values of α and β impact the performance of the model Eq. (3). We let α = 0 : 0.1 : 1 in this simulation. It can be seen that the performance of the model is optimal when α = 0.6. This result implies that the impact of A uv is more significant than B uv . 
2) USER CONTENT PREFERENCE
In this section, we provide the numerical results for evaluating the performance of the prediction model for user content preference. In fact, reliable comprehensive data of the context information about the request probability are difficult to obtain. To make the generated data as realistic as possible, we select the real dataset MovieLens as the experimental data.
MovieLens [33] contains a total of 100,000 rating records scored by 943 independent users on 1682 films. Ratings are mapped into the request probability according to the scores and the time-stamps recorded in the dataset. In the process of the experiment, 20000 rating records are extracted as the test set, and the others are considered as the training set for learning. Fig. 3 depicts the file similarity based user preference prediction accuracy with different history content request number. Prediction accuracy is defined as the ratio of the times that the content with the highest predicted request probability is requested by the user in future to the overall times of prediction. It can be observed that user preference prediction becomes more accurate when more history data is available. In other words, users' preference to a certain category of movie can be predicted more precisely with more input data. Fig. 4 analyzes the content preference similarity of users from different group. It can be observed that, with bigger age gap, content preference similarity becomes smaller. On the other hand, the content preference difference between different occupation group is more significant comparing to different age groups. Accordingly, when utilizing user similarity to predict content preference, higher weight value should be assigned to occupation attribute.
B. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Throughout this section, we assume there are a total of N = 100 content items, which have identical size L = 1. In addition, the users are equipped with identical storage space K files. D2D transmitters' energy cost for unit transmitted data ξ e = 2 and the investment per cached unit data charged by the operator in the off-peak time ξ c = 1. The MNO's income per unit requested content delivery bit in the peak hour ξ R = 10 and the energy consumption of BS transmission ξ E = 9. The D2D link connective probability of user u and v is set to be random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Common simulation parameters for all the figures are summarized in Table 3 .
In order to show the satisfactory performance of our proposed algorithm, we compare the performance of the following schemes in terms of cache hit ratio:
• Most Popular Contents (MPC): Same with the popularity model adopted in [28] [30], the global content request probability is employed. Accordingly, each D2D transmitter caches the globally most popular contents to maximize hit ratio.
• Fair Caching (FC): Each D2D transmitter caches the same proportion of every content.
• Fully Cooperative Caching(FCC): Using proposed fully cooperative caching scheme.
• Non-cooperative Caching(NCC): Based on Stackelberg game. It can be observed that the hit ratio of non-cooperative scheme increases at first because cache capacity increasing results in more cached contents. From a particular point, it becomes constant even with increasing capacity. This is because caching more contents won't make profit for D2D transmitters. Accordingly, they are unwilling to cooperate even with spare storage. In contrast, cooperative scenarios with more capacity will result in more cached contents, thus even FC and MPC will surpass non-cooperative case with a sufficiently large storage space. It can be deduced that increasing cache capacity is not essential for non-cooperative case to improve system performance. Fig. 6 shows the hit ratio versus the number of D2D transmitters, where the cache capacity K = 6 files and the number of D2D transmitters ranges from 10 to 100. From this figure, we can see that more users means more cached contents in the D2D network, thereby leading to higher hit ratio for non-cooperative scenario. In addition, more user also means more successful D2D connections. Nevertheless, MPC will not increase hit probability with more users due to imprecise content request estimation. When the number of users is low, even cooperative MPC outperforms non-cooperative scheme because D2D transmitters are unwilling to cache contents due to low probability to meet each other. An inference is that user number namely cooperation participants is essential for non-cooperative case to improve system performance.
C. INCENTIVE DESIGN AND PROFIT ANALYSIS
In this section, numerical results verify the existence of the SE and the advantage of the proposed incentive scheme in terms of the profit for the operator and D2D transmitters. Fig. 7 illustrates the impact of incentive price on the activeness of D2D communications with difference cache capacity, where the number of D2D transmitters is U = 30. Moreover, D2D activeness is defined as the ratio of the users that have cached contents to the total number of users. From this figure, one observation is that the gap between difference cache capacity becomes bigger when incentive price increases. This indicates that users are more active to employ more storage and share contents with others if incentive price is sufficiently high. When incentive price is low, even increasing capacity will not make much difference with different cache capacity. Fig. 8 illustrates a similar result with Fig. 7 . In particular, a higher incentive price results in more cached contents thereby making more profit for the D2D transmitters. Fig. 9 demonstrates the effect of incentive price on the profit of MNO with varying user device number, where the cache capacity K = 6 files. In this figure, we observe that the profit of MNO is highest with a medium incentive price. This is because few users are willing to cache and share contents with others with low incentive price, which incurs few income. On the other hand, high price motivates more users to cooperate with an increasing cost. Furthermore, with the same incentive price, MNO makes more profit when user number is larger. The reason is that more users participate in cooperation for content caching and delivery. In addition to the observations from Fig. 6 , we can draw an inference that higher user number is not only a positive factor for system communication performance but also helps improve network economic performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on network traffic offloading problem through device caching. Prediction models to evaluate users' encounter probability and content preference are designed and a content placement algorithm is proposed for fully cooperate scenario. A Stackelberg game based device caching strategy and incentive price design are discussed.
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